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Abstract
Background: In Italy, copayment has changed its nature and it can no longer be simply considered a system to curb
inappropriate expenditure. It has become an important form of revenue for public health care provision, but it might
also become a source of distortions in income and health benefits redistribution.
Methods: We use a rich administrative dataset gathering information on patients demand (whose records have
been matched to income declared for tax purposes) to study the effects of an additional copayment (the so called
“superticket” introduced by the Italian government in 2012) in Lombardy, the biggest Italian Region whose
socio-economic dimension is comparable to that of many European countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Switzerland, etc.).
Results: Our analysis shows that at the aggregate level the non-uniform superticket schedule adopted in Lombardy
is slightly pro-poor, but this result coexists with evidences pointing towards possible cases of restriction to access
caused by the additional copayment.
Conclusions: The introduction of the superticket and the ensuing increase in the out-of pocket payment for health
care raises questions about the distribution of the burden among patients, and the sustainability of the extra revenue
through time. This issue needs to be further investigated by combining health status data with the information in this
dataset.
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Background
Copayment was firstly introduced in public health care
systems to curb inappropriate expenditure; nowadays it
produces substantial revenues, but it might become a bar-
rier to access to health care [1, 2, 4, 5, 9]. In this article
we focus on the effects of the increase in the copayment
for diagnostic tests and ambulatory care in Italy where
copayments are means and health tested through a set of
exemptions set at national and regional level [7, 10].
Since 2012, two different cost sharing schemes coexist:
a regional and a national one (the so called “superticket”).
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In that year the Italian Government reduced the equali-
sation grant to each Region by an amount equal to e10
times the number of prescriptions reimbursed by each
Regional Health care System (RHS) in 2011. Regions were
allowed to set their own superticket schedule to cover the
gap [7, 10]. Three schemes were adopted: (1) a uniform
superticket equal to e10 for each prescription; (2) a cost-
related extra payment and (3) a means tested superticket.
In this paper we analyse the effects of the introduction of
the superticket on outpatient prescriptions in Lombardy
using a rich administrative dataset with information on
patients demand whose records have been matched to
income declared for tax purposes. Lombardy is the biggest
Italian region, with a population of about 10million inhab-
itants (17% of Italy’s population) and a GDP equal to 25%
of the national one. Hence, its socio-economic dimension
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is comparable with that of many European countries (e.g.,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, etc.).
For the superticket, Lombardy adopted a cost-related
scheme with an extra-payment proportional to the cost
of service/reimbursement schedule, starting from e0 (for
treatments whose regional reimbursement is belowe5) to
e30 (for prescriptions with reimbursement above e100),
as shown in Table 1 (column #2). The schedule was deter-
mined by the Regional Government using a budget bal-
ance hypothesis. Taking year 2011 as reference, and under
the assumption of no change in the demand composition,
the superticket in 2012 should have exactly compensated
the reduction in the national equalisation grant, i.e., about
135 million Euro.
The schedule adopted in Lombardy allows to reduce the
burden of the extra charge on low value prescriptions,
which would be priced well above their reimbursement
cost, but it does not avoid overcharging completely. As
a result, for outpatient prescriptions whose user charge
is below e51 patients pay more than the amount reim-
bursed by Lombardy to the provider. For prescriptions
above this threshold patients pay instead less than the cost
(i.e., copayment is restored), but the superticket varies
from e15 to e30.
In this paper we use a unique dataset to study the dis-
tribution of the revenue of the superticket across two
dimensions: (1) the value of the prescriptions (defined as
the amount paid to the provider by the Lombardy Region)
and (2) the group of individuals that has to pay more (or
less) for it. The first dimension allows to determine the
actual distribution of the superticket across prescriptions
while the second dimension allows some speculations on
the distributive impact of this extra charge.
Methods
The dataset used includes individual administrative
records provided by the Regional Social Health Care
Information System on outpatients prescriptions and by
the Tax and Income Department of the Lombardy Region
on individual and family incomes. Data for about 9 mil-
lion individuals with at least one outpatient prescription
in 2012 were recorded and treated after being made
anonymous. The outpatient database collects data for
administrative purposes regarding 40,634,616 prescrip-
tions (reporting the value of prescription, the regional
copayment, the superticket, etc.). Individual and family
incomes are related to year 2010 and were then associated
to each citizen to investigate the relationship between dis-
posable income and healthcare consumption levels (See
[11] for a detailed overview of the system). Fiscal data
may underestimate true income for self employed (due
to omissions and tax evasion), but they represent the
only reliable source of data at individual level. For this
reason, we present our empirical analysis for employees
and self-employed and check whether there is any signif-
icant difference in the relationship between income and
Table 1 Copayment, superticket, prescriptions, revenue and cost for regional health service. Lombardy, 2012
Cost of Regional Superticket Number of Cost for Regional Ticket Superticket Relative
service (e) Copayment (e) (e) prescriptions RHS (e) revenue (e) revenue (e) price
< 5 Cost of service 0 1,251,256 3,922,183.5 1,280,274.2 20 0.33
5.01–10 Cost of service 1.5 766,241 5,776,744.0 5,766,124.4 1,152,325 1.20
10.1–15 Cost of service 3 972,005 12,266,593.2 12,199,577.8 2,902,677.8 1.23
15.01–20 Cost of service 4.5 2,851,658 49,988,059.1 49,819,215.9 12,783,255.1 1.25
20.01–25 Cost of service 6 2,532,925 56,989,625.0 56,767,377.5 15,119,559.4 1.26
25.01–30 Cost of service 7.5 636,307 17,510,193.5 17,099,649.5 4,644,582.1 1.24
30.01–36 Cost of service 9 977,603 31,970,282.8 31,464,748.6 8,646,470.1 1.25
36.01–41 36 10.8 480,011 18,734,049.8 16,893,854.7 5,055,352.5 1.17
41.01–46 36 12.3 619,499 27,294,168.8 22,026,288.1 7,503,356.8 1.08
46.01–51 36 13.8 219,843 10,573,257.9 7,726,886.7 2,933,118.7 1.01
51.01–56 36 15.3 286,473 15,113,567.4 10,154,370.6 4,278,278.2 0.95
56.01–65 36 16.8 458,551 27,984,658.1 16,348,194.7 7,572,823.6 0.85
65.01–76 36 19.5 515,575 36,303,131.1 18,480,666.2 9,952,636.2 0.78
76.01–85 36 22.8 283,236 23,142,023.3 10,165,653.3 6,396,458.7 0.72
85.01–100 36 25.5 210,611 19,537,531 7,563,370 5,322,495.1 0.66
> 100 36 30 1,160,358 327,923,400.1 41,654,852.1 34,598,231.3 0.23
Total 14,222,152 685,029,469 325,411,105 128,861,641 0.66
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Fig. 1 Individual income distribution
prescriptions. Figure 1 compares the income distribution
between our 2010 Lombardy income declaration data and
the EU-SILC Lombardy income data.1 The two distribu-
tions are clearly similar with the only exception of a small
difference in the left tie.2
Another possible shortcoming of our data is the two-
year lag between individual income and outpatient con-
sumption datasets. If it is possible that a small fraction
of individuals3 may have experienced a reduction in their
ability to pay for health care due to the global economic
crisis (but we can control for this using income exemp-
tions in 2012), it should also be noted that the timing
of income declaration in Italy justifies the two-year lag
between income and prescription data. In order to obtain
a copayment (full or partial) exemption in 2012 individu-
als have to apply and show their latest income declaration.
For this reason, in the period January-September 2012 the
latest income declaration is that of 2011, related to 2010
income.4
The copayment system foresees two types of exemp-
tions: income and chronic condition.5 In Lombardy,
individuals (and their family members with no income)
may be eligible for an income exemption (i.e., any pre-
scription free of charge) if they fall into one of the
following groups:
• the family income is below e8,263.31 (or e11,362.05
with a spouse with no income) increased by e516.46
for each children;
• the family income is below e36,151.98 and members
are aged 65+;
• social pension (equal to e5,824.91) recipients;
• unemployed registered in employment centers.
Chronic patients suffering from a set list of illnesses
are also eligible to receive free health care, provided
that the prescription is related to their chronic condi-
tion. This information is available in our dataset and
these individuals (exempted for income or chronic con-
dition) have been excluded from the analysis; the dataset
so obtained was then sorted according to the value of the
prescriptions.
Table 2 Total, non exempt and “mixed” prescriptions. Lombardy, 2012
Cost of Total Non exempt Mixed Mixed Superticket
Service (e) prescriptions prescriptions prescriptions (% on total)
< 5 1,251,256 2 1,251,254 0 99.99%
5.01-10 766,241 762,247 3,994 1.5 0.52%
10.1-15 972,005 958,760 13,245 3 1.36%
15.01-20 2,851,658 2,826,108 25,550 4.5 0.90%
20.01-25 2,532,925 2,510,297 22,628 6 0.89%
25.01-30 636,307 606,755 29,552 7.5 4.64%
30.01-36 977,603 946,667 30,936 9 3.16%
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Table 3 Distribution of prescriptions and patients’ payments by demand type, Lombardy, 2012
Family Exempt Group #1 Group #2 Group #3
income (e) patients Patients with relative price< 1 Patients with relative price> 1 Non exempt-high users
Number Number Average Av. presc. Number Average Av. presc. Number Average Av. presc.
pay (e) number pay (e) number pay (e) number
< 8, 000 335,877 27,892 23.55 1.29 145,167 12.22 2.06 98,395 51.90 4.96
8,001-15,000 508,364 32,302 22.20 1.28 157,252 12.33 2.06 114,176 53.63 5.15
15,001-24,000 906,051 73,338 23.88 1.30 356,336 12.71 2.12 285,970 55.25 5.24
24,001-35,000 716,073 61,622 24.93 1.32 293,852 13.32 2.20 264,775 57.78 5.42
35,001-55,000 616,505 69,321 27.20 1.36 364,339 14.30 2.34 386,695 61.03 5.73
55,001-75,000 228,628 29,548 28.38 1.37 155,955 14.83 2.40 172,889 61.89 5.81
> 75, 001 215,432 35,329 29.66 1.37 161,780 14.75 2.38 179,125 60.85 5.66
Total 3,526,930 329,352 25.61 1.32 1,634,681 13.50 2.20 1,502,025 58.27 5.36
Not matched 585,151 40,103 210,264 141,277
As shown in Table 1, prescriptions have been sorted
in 17 groups which correspond to the superticket sched-
ule foreseen by Lombardy; the lowest class corresponds
to a provider’s reimbursement lower than e5 (and
no superticket), while the highest has a prescription
cost higher than e100 (and a superticket of e30). For
each class we record the copayment (column #2), the
superticket schedule (column #3), the total number of pre-
scriptions (column #4), the total costs for the regional
health system (column #5), the regional health system rev-
enue (column #6), the superticket revenue (column #7)
and its relative price (column #8). The latter is defined as
the sum of copayment and superticket revenues divided
by the total costs.
In 2012 the regional accounting system still allowed
for “mixed prescriptions”, i.e., disease-specific exempt
treatments that could be jointly prescribed with non-
exempt ones. Unfortunately, information in the dataset
does not allow to separate the prescription costs and
revenues due to non-exempt treatments. As a conse-
quence, the relative price presented in the last column
of Table 1 may be underestimated. For the treatments
falling into the e0-36 classes it is possible to identify
these mixed prescriptions and compute their frequen-
cies (see Table 2). Their contribution to the superticket
revenue is only 0.52% in the e5.01-10 cost of service
class and at most for 4.64% in the e25.01-30 class.
We are confident that they do not alter the qualitative
results of our analysis.
Our main goal is to identify the distributive impact of
the superticket. We use three measures: (1) the Kakwany
index; (2) the ANOVA analysis, and (3) the econometric
analysis of individual demand and costs for the regional
health service (based on income, demand groups and
employment status). The Kakwani index K [3], is given by
the following expression:
K = GS − GI
Fig. 2 Distribution of prescriptions by income groups
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Table 4 Tests for differences in superticket payments among
income classes
Group #1
F–statistic P-value H0: equal mean among income classes
715.4 0.00∗∗∗ not accepted
Observations: 369,455
Group #2
F–statistic P-value H0: equal mean among income classes
2,046.4 0.00∗∗∗ not accepted
Observations: 1,844,945
Group #3
F–statistic P-value H0: equal mean among income classes
1,604. 0.00∗∗∗ not accepted
Observations: 1,643,302
Legend: ∗∗∗ = 1% statistical significance
where GS is the Gini concentration index of the extra pay-
ment due to superticket and GI is the Gini coefficient
for the income distribution. To evaluate GS and GI , indi-
vidual income and prescription expenditure were divided
into seven groups of family income, as shown in Table 3.
The first group (income lower thane8,000) represents the
cut-off for income exemption. The other classes have an
income varying from e8,000 to more than e75,000.
For each income category we divide users into three
demand groups: Group #1, where patients demand only
prescriptions whose cost is above e51 (i.e., with rela-
tive price< 1). Patients in this group may be charged a
superticket varying between e15.01 and e30. For these
patients the superticket is higher than what they would
have paid under a uniform regime, but the treatments
they demand are partially subsidized. Group #2 represents
patients that have demanded only prescriptions whose
Table 5 Tests for differences in number of prescriptions among
income classes
Group #1
F–statistic P-value H0: equal mean among income classes
13.022 0.00∗∗∗ not accepted
Observations: 369,455
Group #2
F–statistic P-value H0: equal mean among income classes
2,929.995 0.00∗∗∗ not accepted
Observations: 1,844,945
Group #3
F–statistic P-value H0: equal mean among income classes
1,165.096, 0.00∗∗∗ not accepted
Observations: 1,643,302
Legend: ∗∗∗ = 1% statistical significance
Table 6 Determinants of individual copayment and
cost-of-service
Dependent variable
Independent variables Copayment (Model #1) Cost (Model #2)
Number of prescriptions 3.805c 9.055c
Female 3.701c –6.507c
Age 0.236c 0.946c
Number of children –0.285c –2.190c
Family members with disability 2.622c 4.915a
Dependent spouse –0.662c –6.176c
Self Employed –1.194c 0.817
Employed 2.632c 6.631c
Retired 1.694c –1.715a
Income classes
< 8, 000 –0.546 –3.672
8, 001− 15, 000 2.768c 3.536
15, 001− 24, 000 3.991c 9.651a
24, 001− 35, 000 5.613c 12.61c
35, 001− 55, 000 8.880c 19.70c
55, 001− 75, 000 7.062c 10.46b
> 75, 001 –0.48 –4.908
Demand groups
Group #1 –36.22c –32.09c
Group #2 –36.59c –61.42c
Interaction income
classes-demand groups
< 8, 000× Group #1 –0.535 –0.891
< 8, 000× Group #2 –1.068 3.676
8, 001− 15, 000× Group #1 –6.199c –13.24b
8, 001− 15, 000× Group #2 –6.126c –11.03
15, 001− 24, 000× Group #1 –6.092c –14.79c
15, 001− 24, 000× Group #2 –8.025c –19.92
24, 001− 35, 000× Group #1 –8.092c –17.79c
24, 001− 35, 000× Group #2 –9.537c –24.93a
35, 001− 55, 000× Group #1 –10.06c -22.44c
35, 001− 55, 000× Group #2 –12.23c –32.42b
55, 001− 75, 000× Group #1 –9.340c –16.85c
55, 001− 75, 000× Group #2 –9.743c –22.48a
> 75, 001× Group #1 –5.991c –10.16a
> 75, 001× Group #2 –3.142 –8.194
ASL dummies included included
Marital status dummies included included
Constant 40.12c 40.48c
Observations 2,301,571 2,301,571
R-squared 0.607 0.166
BIC 24,620,754.3 32,831,101.4
Legend: a 10% significance level; b 5%; c 1%
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cost is below e51 (relative price > 1). They benefit from
the non uniform superticket regime schedule since the
average superticket they pay is less than e10. However,
their relative price is higher than 1 which implies had they
addressed the demand to the private sector they could
have been charged a lower price. Group #3 represents
individuals that have paid the copayment for at least one
prescription both with relative price below and above 1.
The ANOVA analysis is used to test whether the aver-
age superticket payment is significantly different among
the 7 income classes in the three demand groups. An F
test for the null hypothesis that the average superticket
expenditure is the same allows to accept or reject this
hypothesis.6
The demand for prescriptions has been further investi-
gated using a cross-section analysis at individual level. The
following model is estimated:
Y = a+ bX+c! + ϵ (1)
where Y is the individual copayment expenditure (Model
#1) or the cost generated by the demand (Model #2). X is
a vector of individual characteristics (sex, age, marital sta-
tus, number of children, number of disabled persons in the
family, the local health authority of residence - Azienda
Sanitaria Locale–ASL). ! is a vector of covariates that
includes income class, the demand group (i.e., Group #1,
#2 or #3), the employment status (employee, pensioner,
self-employed) and some interaction variables.
Equation (1) has been estimated for the whole sample
with the inclusion of a dummy variable for self-employed,
and for a sub samples consisting of employees and self-
employed only. In this way we can control for tax evasion.
Results
In year 2012 the total number of prescriptions in
Lombardy was equal to 40,634,616. The superticket was
paid only for 12,970,896 prescriptions, since 27,789,625
prescriptions were exempt and 1,251,256 were in thee0-5
class, whose superticket is equal to 0 (see Table 1). The
total revenue generated amounted to e132 million which
is quite close to the target of e135 million that Lombardy
had to reach in order to compensate for the lower grant
received from the Central Government. The revenue gen-
erated by residents in Lombardy is equal to e128,861,641
(see Table 1) while the rest has been paid by non residents.
Prescriptions over e100 account for 26% of the rev-
enue while those with cost range e15-25 raise about 20%.
The rest is spread evenly among the other classes. The
third column in Table 1 shows the superticket schedule.
Prescriptions up to e36 benefit from the non uniform
schedule adopted in Lombardy since they are charged a
superticket lower thane10. They represent 9,987,995 pre-
scriptions (70% of the total). As mentioned before, the
last column in Table 1 shows the relative price in each
class. The average relative price is 1.2, i.e. patients pay
20% more than the regional reimbursement. The cost to
the Regional Health System for prescriptions falling in this
range (where most of the demand is concentrated) is equal
to e235,025,158; the revenue for the Regional Govern-
ment is equal to e281,784,715. Hence, the net gain for
the Lombardy Region is e46,759,557.7 In the range above
e51 the relative price varies between 0.23 and 0.95 and the
copayment regime is restored.
The average superticket is about e10; for a prescription
whose cost is below e51 is equal to e6, while for those
with cost higher than e51 is equal to e23.50, with a lim-
ited and not significant variance (standard deviation equal
to e2.54) between income groups.
Fig. 3Marginal effect of income classes on superticket
Berta et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:336 Page 7 of 12
Table 7 Sensitivity analysis: including a dummy only for self-employed interacted with income classes and demand groups
Variables Copayment (Model #1) Cost (Model #2)
Number of prescriptions 3.805*** 9.052***
Female 3.592*** –6.630***
Age 0.222*** 0.792***
Number of children –0.286*** –1.746***
Family members with disability 2.674*** 5.387*
Dependent spouse –0.444*** –5.422***
Self Employed 2.489 –0.487
Income classes
8, 000 2.641* -1.856
8, 001− 15, 000 7.573*** 7.664
15, 001− 24, 000 9.287*** 14.36*
24, 001− 35, 000 11.18*** 18.55**
35, 001− 55, 000 14.76*** 26.01***
55, 001− 75, 000 12.74*** 16.41*
> 75, 001 5.228*** 1.454
Demand groups
Group #1 –35.69*** –32.45***
Group #2 –34.74*** –59.10**
Interaction income classes-demand groups
8, 000 # Group #1 –1.688 –5.578
8, 000 # Group #2 –3.386 –0.212
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #1 –7.694*** –15.86
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #2 –8.731** –14.29
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #1 –7.252*** –15.36
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #2 –10.53*** –22.78
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #1 –9.409*** –18.91*
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #2 –12.16*** –28.55
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #1 –11.39*** –23.16**
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #2 –14.90*** –35.84
55, 001− 75, 000 # Group #1 –10.52*** –17.76*
55, 001− 75, 000 # Group #2 –12.02*** –24.82
> 75, 001 # Group #1 –7.876*** –13.06
> 75, 001 # Group #2 –5.68 –10.94
Interaction income classes-self employed
8, 000 # Self Employed –3.786* –3.611
8, 001− 15, 000 # Self Employed –5.629*** –4.236
15, 001− 24, 000 # Self Employed –8.117*** –5.236
24, 001− 35, 000 # Self Employed –9.487*** –11.69
35, 001− 55, 000 # Self Employed –11.13*** –13.32
55, 001− 75, 000 # Self Employed –8.184*** –6.413
> 75, 001 # Self Employed –6.888*** –4.844
Interaction demand groups-self employed
Group #1 # Self Employed –0.796 0.195
Group #2 # Self Employed –2.629 –3.847
Interaction income classes-demand groups-self employed
8, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 2.39 12.91
8, 000 # Group #2 # Self Employed 3.949 7.438
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 4.813** 11.95
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #2 # Self Employed 6.03 7.423
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 5.258** 5.518
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #2 # Self Employed 7.415 6.923
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 6.387*** 9.65
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #2 # Self Employed 8.242* 12.58
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 7.309*** 9.288
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #2 # Self Employed 9.505* 14.1
55, 001− 75, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 4.911** 8.113
55, 001− 75, 000 # Group #2 # Self Employed 5.503 4.98
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Table 7 Sensitivity analysis: including a dummy only for self-employed interacted with income classes and demand groups (Continued)
> 75, 001 # Group #1 # Self Employed 5.616*** 11.57
> 75, 001 # Group #2 # Self Employed 5.087 4.929
ASL dummies included included
Marital status dummies included included
Constant 38.15*** 47.79***
Observations 2,301,571 2,301,571
R-squared 0.607 0.166
BIC 24,620,686.1 32,831,464.5
Legend: * 10% significance level; ** 5%; *** 1%
Figure 2 shows the distribution of prescriptions among
different income groups per cost of service class. About
35-40% of the prescriptions fall in the e15-25 cost class,
about 15% belongs to the e0-15 class and the rest is
evenly distributed among the other classes. The distribu-
tion is skewed to the right for low income groups, which
means that the demand for costly prescriptions is more
frequently made by high income individuals. Given the
superticket schedule presented in Table 1 this means that
its payment is borne more by rich than poor individuals.
The Kakwani index is equal to 0.21: this is a first evi-
dence that the effect of the superticket regime introduced
in Lombardy is slightly progressive. Further insights into
the distribution of the payment can be gained by analysing
the superticket payments and consumption for the three
previously identified demand groups: Group #1 (the high-
cost consumption group), Group #2 (the low-cost con-
sumption group) and Group #3 (the mix consumption
group). The average superticket for patients belonging to
Group #1 is e25.61 (see Table 3). The average payment is
increasing in income, from e23.55 for the lowest income
class to e29.66 for the highest one (the difference is on
average e6.11, i.e. +25.9%).
The average superticket for patients in Group #2 is equal
to e13.50, about half of the average payment in Group
#1. Again, the average payment is slightly increasing in
income (from e12.22 for patients belonging to the low-
est income group to e14.75 for those in the highest one).
On average, the highest income class pays e2.55 (+20.9%)
more that the lowest class.
The picture changes dramatically when we examine
Group #3 (the last two columns of Table 3). The annual
average superticket shoots up to e58.27, with a signifi-
cant difference between the bottom and the top end of the
income distribution (e51.90 for the lowest income class
and e60.85 for highest class, i.e, e8.95).
Table 3 also presents the average number of annual pre-
scriptions by income classes among the three demand
groups. The annual number of prescriptions is lower in
Group #1 (1.32) and higher in Group #3 (5.36 more than
4 times higher), with Group #2 in the middle (2.20).
For this reason, we can consider individuals in Group
#3 as high users. The difference in average consumption
between bottom and top income groups is +6.2% in Group
#1, +15.5% in Group #2 and +14.1% in Group #3. Con-
sumption is higher the greater is the income, and this is
particularly important for consumers belonging to Group
#3, the high users.
A more robust evidence of the effects of the superticket
on health care demand may be obtained by applying the
ANOVA analysis to test for the difference in expenditure
and in the number in prescription across demand groups.
The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5.
The null hypothesis cannot be accepted for any of the
three demand groups. This means that the superticket
expenditure as well as the number of prescriptions is
increasing in income. The differences among the income
groups may also be due to an age effect (young, healthy
individuals may have a lower average income; or retired
people may have a pathology exemption and are not con-
sidered in our sample) and it would be worth to investigate
it further.
Finally, we investigate the demand for prescriptions
using the model presented in Eq. (1). The results for the
complete sample are presented in Table 6, both for Model
#1 (copayment expenditure as dependent variable) and for
Model #2 (cost for the regional health care regional sys-
tem as dependent variable).8 As expected, consumption
has a positive and statistically significant impact on copay-
ment expenditure (+3.805). On average, the copayment
paid is increasing with income (the no-income class is
the baseline); this confirms that the system is slightly pro-
gressive as shown by the Kakwani index. Female patients
pay more than male (+3.701); copayment expenditure
increases with the patient’s age (+0.236) and is lower the
higher the number of children (-0.285). This may be due
to the low health care demand of young people living
with the family. The copayment expenditure is higher
if there are family members with disability (+2.622),
but it is lower if the spouse has no income (-0.662).
Finally, self-employed have lower copayment than the
baseline income group (-0.662), while employed and
retired have higher copayment expenditures (respectively
+2.632 and +1.694). As shown in Table 6 we have con-
trolled for the ASL fixed effects and for some demographic
characteristics of the prescription’s payer, i.e., whether it is
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Table 8 Sensitivity analysis: self-employed dummy. Self-employed and employed subsample
Variables Copayment (Model #1) Cost (Model #2)
Number of prescriptions 3.705*** 8.874***
Female 4.517*** –8.412***
Age 0.386*** 1.175***
Number of children –0.00863 –1.698***
Family members with disability 3.171*** 6.652**
Dependent spouse –1.598*** –8.886***
Self Employed 6.185 6.629
Income classes
8, 000 9.087 7.45
8, 001− 15, 000 11.41 15.39
15, 001− 24, 000 12.95 23.81
24, 001− 35, 000 13.86* 24.81
35, 001− 55, 000 14.17* 26.16
55, 001− 75, 000 11.85 14.4
> 75, 001 4.776 –1.135
Demand groups
Group #1 –28.20*** –30.86
Group #2 –18.68 –47.81
Interaction income classes-demand groups
8, 000 # Group #1 –11.07 –9.335
8, 000 # Group #2 -22.46 -9.417
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #1 –12.66 –12.19
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #2 –23.89 –19.9
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #1 –12.49 –13.5
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #2 –25.99 –32.26
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #1 –14.62 –16.5
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #2 –27.4 –37.17
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #1 –16.11* –21.23
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #2 –27.75 –40.61
55, 001− 75, 000 # Group #1 –15.81 –15.64
55, 001− 75, 000 # –25.24 –28.98
> 75, 001 # Group #1 –13.87 –11.67
> 75, 001 # Group #2 –19.66 –15.39
Interaction income classes-self employed
8, 000 # Self Employed –10.62 –13.94
8, 001− 15, 000 # Self Employed –10.21 –14.02
15, 001− 24, 000 # Self Employed –12.8 –17.72
24, 001− 35, 000 # Self Employed –13.53* –21.94
35, 001− 55, 000 # Self Employed –12.68 –19.61
55, 001− 75, 000 # Self Employed –9.665 –11.28
> 75, 001 # Self Employed –8.995 –9.57
Interaction demand groups-self employed
Group #1 # Self Employed –9.045 –3.248
Group #2# Self Employed –20.12 –17.39
Interaction income classes-demand groups-self employed
8, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 11.78 16.78
8, 000 # Group #2# Self Employed 23.15 16.86
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 9.68 8.141
8, 001− 15, 000 # Group #2# Self Employed 21 12.45
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 10.31 3.395
15, 001− 24, 000 # Group #2# Self Employed 22.55 15.59
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 11.44 7.053
24, 001− 35, 000 # Group #2# Self Employed 23.14 20.38
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 12.1 7.858
35, 001− 55, 000 # Group #2# Self Employed 22.54 19.6
55, 001− 75, 000 # Group #1 # Self Employed 10.26 6.537
55, 001− 75, 000 # Group #2# Self Employed 18.97 10.18
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Table 8 Sensitivity analysis: self-employed dummy. Self-employed and employed subsample (Continued)
> 75, 001 # Group #1 # Self Employed 11.57 10.58
> 75, 001 # Group #2# Self Employed 19.14 10.25
ASL dummies included included
Marital status dummies included included
Constant 29.53*** 29.71
Observations 1,688,020 1,688,020
R-squared 0.599 0.162
BIC 17,951,547.9 23,988,370.4
Legend: * 10% significance level; ** 5%; *** 1%
single or married, divorced, widower, etc. The results for
the regional health care cost are similar; for this reason
they are not discussed.
From Table 6 we can obtain the marginal effects of
income for the three demand groups (computed at the
sample mean of the other variables). They are shown in
Fig. 3. The income classes are reported on the horizontal
axis while the predicted superticket payment is on the ver-
tical axis. High users (Group #3) pay higher copayments,
increasing with income, while the other two groups have
similar trends, both in terms of copayment expenditure
and of variation with income. The blue line represents
the average predicted copayment expenditure for high
users (Group #3). The expenditure increases for the first
five income classes and then decreases. This result con-
firms that low income classes have a lower expenditure for
patients belonging to Group #3. The decrease in copay-
ment expenditure for high income classes may be due to
different factors, e.g., a supplementary health care insur-
ance. For the other two demand groups there does not
seem to be the same pattern, with the only exception of
the decrease in copayment expenditure for high income
classes in Group #1.
This is a confirmation that income seems to be an
important determinant of demand for high users, and that
the superticket, by rising the price, may have increased
this difference even further.
A shortcoming of our fiscal data is that income may be
underestimated due to tax evasion. This is more frequent
for self-employed. For this reason, we have performed a
sensitivity analysis by re-estimating Model #1 including
a dummy variable for self-employed and its interaction
with demand groups and income classes shown in Tables 7
and 8. Figures 4 and 5 present the same marginal effects
of income in the sensitivity analysis. They are similar to
those presented in Fig. 3; hence, even if we take tax eva-
sion into account we obtain the same evidence (i.e., the
superticket may be associated with a significant difference
in expenditure especially for high user patients).
Discussion
The revenue from the superticket in 2012 was in line
with what was expected: the 135 million reduction in the
grant from Central Government was matched by an extra
revenue of around 132 million from the superticket. How-
ever, the introduction of the extra charge means that out-
patient treatments whose reimbursement is belowe51 are
charged more than what reimbursed to the provider (see
Table 1). In year 2012 this produced a net revenue equal
to e46,759,557; this income source may drop in the years
Fig. 4Marginal effects of income classes on superticket when self-employed are included
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Fig. 5Marginal effects of income classes on superticket. Self-employed and employed sub-sample
to come: if patients become aware of this extra payment,
they may start looking for cheaper alternatives in the pri-
vate market. Indeed, private labs are starting to attract
patients out of the public health care system by advertising
lower prices than the copayment (see, for example, http://
novolabs.it/index.php/tariffe/ssn-e-ticket). The non lin-
ear schedule chosen by Lombardy means that prescrip-
tions in the e0-36 cost range cost to patients less than
under the uniform system; users in this class are some-
how the gainer of this reform. Our results shows that
about 70% of non exempt prescriptions falls in this range
and that in general they form a more consistent share
of the prescriptions demanded by low income groups,
but this result coexists with evidences pointing towards
differences in health care expenditure caused by the
superticket. This is particularly relevant for the high-
users, as shown by our analysis.
Conclusions
The increase in the out of pocket payment due to the
introduction of the superticket raises questions about the
distribution of the burden among patients and the barriers
to access that it may have created. From the revenue side,
in the short run, the policy is sustainable, but competi-
tion from private providers casts some doubts on long-run
perspectives.
On the distribution side, the “paternalistic goods”
nature of health care services [6, 8] means that there are
two dimensions on which redistribution should be evalu-
ated: (1) the health status measuring the need for care and
income, (2) the income effects in the access to health care.
Our data do not allow to study the first dimension since
the only available health-related information is exemption
for pathology. This issue should be furtherly investigated
in future research where this dataset might be matched
with health status variables in order to assess whether the
superticket may also create barriers to the access to health
care services.
Endnotes
1 The EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Condi-
tions) is one of the main source of information on social
and economic conditions in Member States. It is based on
survey data and it is the most important source available
in Europe for individual income distributions.
2 The difference is due to the very small number of
individuals that have only tax with holding income decla-
rations; the latter do not report identifiers for other family
members. Therefore they are treated as individuals with
independent income, and this slightly increases the left
tie frequency of the distribution of our income data in
comparison to those of EU-SILC.
3This occurrence is rather limited: according to offi-
cial statistics unemployment in Lombardy increased from
5.5% in 2010 to 7.4% in 2012; which means an increase
in unemployed people by 95,000 units. Since our dataset
covers 5,805,177 individuals having declared an income
in 2010 and receiving at least one treatment in 2012, the
maximum possible incidence of this temporal asymmetry
is rather small (less than 2%).
4A fraction of individuals had to be dropped from the
analysis because it was impossible to get a match for
their income, mainly due to unemployment conditions or
administrative residence outside the region.
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5 These are the general principles; the system foresees
exceptions and special cases. For a more specific descrip-
tion see [7, 10].
6 The standard ANOVA test requires equal variance
among the different income classes. If this is not ful-
filled, as in our case, it is possible to apply the simulated
ANOVA, which simulates 1000 replications of the stan-
dard ANOVA test and computes how many times the
p-value of the test is higher than that of the standard
ANOVA. If the p-value of the simulated ANOVA test is
lower than that of the standard test the results obtained
with the latter are not distorted.
7 It is possible to argue that this amount represents a
potential loss for the regional budget if patients, becom-
ing aware that they pay more than the prescription costs,
decide to swap their demand to the private sector, where
they may pay less.
8 To save space standard errors are not reported.
Abbreviation
EU-SILC: European - Statistics on income and living conditions
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